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I started with the goal of writing a review of the book Formulizing Common Sense: 
Papers by John McCarthy, a collection of seventeen papers, listed in the bibliography 
from [ 21 to [ 181 in the same order and numbering. (This collection contains also 
an introductory overview by Vladimir Lifschitz, referenced as [ 1 ] .) This goal seemed 
quite challenging for at least two reasons. First, this collection contains McCarthy’s most 
influential papers in Artificial Intelligence (AI). McCarthy is one of the founders of AI 
and some of the papers in the collection, e.g. [2,3,7,9], have shaped the field and have 
been a source of inspiration for many researchers. Second, the papers in the collection 
have been written over a long period of time, i.e. between 1959 and 1988. Providing 
a uniform and global (as opposed to paper by paper) perspective on this work was 
something I was not sure would be possible. 
The second worry turned out to be misplaced. A careful reading soon revealed the 
many connections between the different papers and the fact that all of them are contri- 
butions towards the same research project, i.e. the development of an advice taker [ 21. 
It also revealed the distinct flavour that all these papers have, and how much they have 
influenced AI. Finally, the organization of the papers in the collection, which is chrono- 
logical, clearly highlighted the development and refinement over time of such a project, 
starting from the 1959 paper “Programs with Common Sense” [ 21. These discoveries 
shed a new light on McCarthy’s work. They convinced me that the identification and 
development of such a research project is an even more important contribution than the 
individual papers themselves; and that this had to be the topic of the review. 
This review attempts to describe the advice taker project as it emerges from the 
papers of the collection: its evolution over time, what has been achieved, what remains 
to be done, what in my opinion are its strengths and its limitations. My criticisms are 
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not meant to be exhaustive; they are more the natural result of my taste and know 
how. This review hardly reports the many controversial discussions about some basic 
assumptions underlying McCarthy’s research. I have decided to avoid them as I am 
mostly in agreement with McCarthy’s perspective. I am therefore not the right person 
for raising such issues. Also, and more important, I thought that an organic presentation 
and discussion of the project would be more interesting, to write and to read, than a 
metadiscussion about why it should fail or succeed. Finally, as a matter of style, the 
reader will notice that this review makes extensive use of quotations. The quotations 
explicitly separated from the text report concepts which are crucial for the development 
of the review (and, in my opinion, of McCarthy’s research project). 
1. An epistemology of common sense 
I. I. Common sense 
McCarthy clearly states his long term research goal in his 1959 paper [2]. Indeed, 
the title itself, “Programs with Common Sense”, describes it. The following citation 
identifies what characterizes a program with common sense. 
The advice taker is a proposed program for solving problems by manipulating 
sentences in formal languages. 
The main advantages that we expect the advice taker to have is that its 
behavior will be improvable merely by making statements to it, telling it about 
its symbolic environment and what is wanted from it. To make these statements 
will require little if any knowledge of the program or the previous knowledge 
of the advice taker. One will be able to assume that the advice taker will have 
available to it a fairly wide class of immediate consequences of anything it is told 
and its previous knowledge. This property is expected to have much in common 
with what makes us describe certain humans as having common sense. We shall 
therefore say that a program has common sense if it uutomuticully deduces for 
itself a suficiently wide class of immediate consequences of anything it is told 
and what it already knows. [ 2, p. 91 (The page numbers are always those of the 
collection.) 
The above quotation introduces many important ideas. First, it suggests that a program 
or person has common sense if it is able to perform in the same way and as effectively 
as (certain) humans. This might seem to imply that the need for common sense is 
a truism, as the usefulness of a program without common sense becomes unclear. 
McCarthy discusses this issue and further qualifies his research project in [ 151. Here he 
points out that many useful programs have been and can be written which lack (some 
forms of) common sense. For instance, as we can infer from [ 151, a program which 
reasons about other people’s beliefs does not necessarily need common sense about the 
world’s evolution in time. Less obviously, a program which reasons about the world’s 
evolution in time does not necessarily need common sense about the world’s evolution 
in time. Common sense is needed only for particular domains, and only in order to 
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achieve advice taker level performance. From [ 151, two examples of useful programs 
without common sense are chess programs and MYCIN [ 19,201. However, as McCarthy 
points out, this is not without consequences. MYCIN lacks common sense knowledge 
about the world’s evolution in time, a form of common sense which is necessary for 
its correct use. For instance, MYCIN will allow a patient to die of cholera while trying 
to kill the bacteria. To make things worse, MYCIN is unable to understand its own 
limitations, and very hard to extend beyond the goals for which it had been designed. 
In my interpretation of McCarthy’s position, programs without enough common sense, 
e.g. MYCIN, can still be successfully used if the missing common sense is provided by 
the user, with MYCIN, by the physician. It is interesting to notice that the absence of 
common sense does not seem to create problems with chess programs. My explanation is 
that, though these programs do not have common sense, they have enough of it. We have 
very little or no common sense about the chess world (commonsensical consequences 
are something which should be “easy” to compute); chess programs have as much 
common sense as we do. 
Second, the above quotation suggests that a person or program has common sense 
if it is said to be so by some outside observer (in the quotation, us). This leads to a 
subjectivistic notion of common sense. Different people at different points in time have 
different, although perhaps related, common sense. Even the same person in different 
points in time can have different common sense. Consider for instance the chess world. 
Suppose that we were chess masters and that we were able to compute almost effortlessly 
moves beyond the capabilities of a chess program. Then, once we accepted McCarthy’s 
notion of common sense, we would be ready to say that the chess program is without 
common sense (about the chess world). Vice versa, anybody who does not know 
“enough” about cholera will not think that MYCIN does not have common sense. This 
subjectivistic view of common sense might endanger McCarthy’s program as it is unclear 
how it is possible to reproduce what is impossible to define. McCarthy never discusses 
this problem; instead, his attitude has been that of stating what common sense is and of 
proposing ways to formalize it. 
Finally, the above quotation implicitly characterizes the three basic properties of 
common sense. A program or person has common sense if 
Property 1: it knows a sufficiently large set of facts of the environment where it lives; 
Property 2: it can increment what it knows by automatically deducing a sufficiently 
large set of immediate consequences from it; 
Property 3: it can increment what it knows by being told. 
These three properties, which are also discussed at length in [3,6,7], are at the core 
of McCarthy’s research. About property 3 McCarthy writes in [ 141, “What we can 
learn from natural language is not how to express in English what we already know 
how to express in computerese. Rather, we must study those ideas expressible in natural 
language that no one knows how to represent at all in a computer” [p. 1881. This 
issue is taken on in [ 12,5]. In [ 121 McCarthy describes some of the desiderata for 
the “common business communication language” (CBCL), a common language for 
expressing business communications, e.g. requests for price quotations, inquiries about 
the status of delayed orders and references to standard commercial legal agreements. 
The main message is that the most difficult problems in defining a language like CBCL, 
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or even natural language front ends to computer programs, involve deciding what is to 
be sayable. In [5] he discusses the problems which are involved in understanding a 
real-world piece of text, an excerpt from the New York Times about a salesman robbed 
by three unknown persons. He gives a list of questions that an intelligent person or 
program should be able to answer, based on the information provided by the New York 
Times article. In order to achieve these objectives, he introduces ANL, an Artificial 
Natural Language, which is discussed with an approach similar to that used in [ 121 
to describe CBCL. ’ He then gives hints about how to express in ANL the knowledge 
stated in the article with the further complication, with respect to CBCL, of considering 
how to reason about it (i.e. how to achieve at the same time properties 2 and 3). 
Properties I and 2 distinguish between what the advice taker knows and what allows 
it to deduce new facts from what it knows. This is explicitly stated and discussed in 
[ I.51 as a distinction between common sense knowledge and common sense reasoning. A 
very similar distinction is also discussed in [ 31, even if for what concerns intelligence, 
as a distinction between the epistemological and the heuristic part of intelligence.* In 
particular, McCarthy writes: “The epistemological part is the representation of the world 
’ Another early example of natural language understanding based on the use of an internal (conceptual) 
language can be found in I 2 1 1. It is not clear whether there has been any, possibly mutual, influence between 
the two proposals. 
* McCarthy sometimes talks of common sense, e.g. in 12 1, and sometimes of intelligence, e.g. in 131. This 
bouncing back and forth between the two notions is pervasive. In the papers of the collection McCarthy 
never tries to study the relation between intelligence and common sense. However in [ 31, where he talks of 
intelligence for the first time, he writes 
The idea of an intelligent machine is old, but serious work on the artificial intelligence problem, or 
even serious understanding of what the problem is, awaited the stored program computer. 
We shall, therefore, be interested in an intelligent entity that is equipped with a representation or 
model of the world. On the basis of this representation a certain class of internally posed questions 
can be answered, not always correctly. 
we shall say that an entity is intelligent if it has an adequate model of the world (including the 
intellectual world of mathematics, understanding of its own goals, and other mental processes), if it is 
clever enough to answer a wide variety of questions on the basis of the model, if it can get additional 
tnformation from the external world when required, and can perform such tasks in the external world 
as its goals demand and its physical abilities permit. [ p. 23 1 
A careful comparison between the quotation from p. 9 and that from p. 23 suggests that the property of 
being intelligent can be characterized by the same three properties introduced above for common sense. This 
perspective, whose correctness is not an issue in this paper, motivates McCarthy’s attitude (and that taken by 
us here) of using the notions defined for common sense for intelligence and vice versa. It is important to 
notice that the two notions are not collapsed. The main difference seems that intelligence requires that the 
associated capabilities be “good enough” to achieve a goal. Thus the first requirement for having common sense 
is to know about the surrounding environment, while being intelligent requires that such a representation be 
adequate (property I), The second requirement for having common sense is being able to derive consequences 
from what is known, most often without a strong reasoning capability and possibly without involving any 
intelligence [ 21. Intelligence requires instead the capability of answering “a wide variety of questions”, 
possibly on difficult topics, e.g. mathematics and people’s mental processes (property 2). Finally, the third 
requirement for common sense is the possibility to provide data to the advice taker without knowing of 
its actual internal state and functioning. An intelligent entity can instead actively use its capabilities to get 
information from the outside and to act as needed to satisfy a goal (property 3). However, as far as I know, 
these differences have not played any role in McCarthy’s research. 
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in such a form that the solution of problems follows from the facts expressed in the 
representation. The heuristic part is the mechanism that on the basis of the information 
solves the problem and decides what to do” [ 3, pp. 23-241. 
Most of the research in AI has actually concentrated on the heuristic part of intel- 
ligence and has considered the epistemological part only for what is needed in order 
to successfully achieve problem solving. McCarthy’s main interests and most important 
contributions are instead in the epistemological part only, independently of the problem 
solving which needs to be done. The reasons for this choice are explained in [ 61. In 
particular McCarthy writes: 
Considering epistemological problems separately has the following advantages: 
( 1) The same problems of what information is available to an observer and 
what conclusions can be drawn from information arise in connection with a 
variety of problem-solving tasks. 
(2) A single solution of the epistemological problems can support a wide variety 
of heuristic approaches to a problem. 
(3) AI is a very difficult scientific problem, so there are great advantages in 
finding parts of the problem that can be separated out and separately at- 
tacked. 
(4) . . . it is quite difficult to formalize the facts of common knowledge. Existing 
programs that manipulate facts in some of the domains are confined to 
special cases and don’t face the difficulties that must be overcome to achieve 
intelligent behavior. [6, p. 771 
1.2. Epistemological adequacy 
McCarthy’s first step in the study of the epistemological part of intelligence is to clas- 
sify the representation formalisms according to three notions of adequacy. The quotation 
below reports their informal definition, as first given in [ 31. 
A representation is called metaphysically adequate if the world could have that 
form without contradicting the facts of the aspect of reality that interests us. . . . 
A representation is called epistemologically adequate for a person or machine 
if it can be used practically to express the facts that one actually has about the 
aspect of the world. . . . 
A representation is called heuristically adequate if the reasoning processes 
actually gone through in solving a problem are expressible in the language. [pp. 
27-281 
In McCarthy’s view, a full treatment of common sense and its implementation inside 
the advice taker is crucially based on the ideas of epistemological adequacy and heuris- 
tic adequacy (see [ 3,6,7]). McCarthy does not further elaborate the idea of heuristic 
adequacy. In my opinion, the requirement of heuristic adequacy really amounts to re- 
quiring epistemologically adequate representations of reasoning. It is a derived notion, 
and therefore less important than the notion of epistemological adequacy, though crucial 
to the implementation of the advice taker. He further discusses the idea of metaphysical 
adequacy in [ 71, but only to point out that it is a necessary requirement for scientific 
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theories, and that it does not seem enough if one wants to implement common sense 
inside an artifact. As he writes, “The skeptic who doubts whether there is anything to 
say about the world apart from the particular sciences should try to write a computer 
program that can figure out how to get to Timbuktoo, taking into account, not only the 
facts about travel in general, but also the facts about what people and documents have 
what information, and what information will be required at different stages of the trip 
and when and how it is to be obtained. He will rapidly discover that he . . . will be 
unable to express and build into a program ‘what everybody knows’.” [7, pp. 114-l 1.51. 
McCarthy’s main interests are in fact concentrated on epistemological adequacy. Most 
of McCarthy’s technical work, e.g. the work described in [ 5-9,16,17], aims at devel- 
oping epistemologically adequate theories of common sense. He presents and discusses 
the idea of epistemological adequacy in various other places, see for instance [3, p. 
301, 16, p. 701, [7. p. 931 and [ 13, p. 1811. Interestingly, all these discussions have 
a slightly different emphasis. However it appears quite clear that epistemological ade- 
quacy poses two important constraints on representations, both constraints being implicit 
in the word practically in the quotation from pp. 27-28. The first is ontological:” the 
representation language must represent the common sense informatic situation, i.e. it 
must represent information at the level of abstraction used by people during their ev- 
eryday activities (see [4] for more detail about McCarthy’s notion of information).4 
This requirement seems appropriate as it allows us to build machines able, for instance, 
to interact meaningfully with humans (e.g. to get information by being told) without 
relying on ad hoc or hardwired mechanisms. We cannot teach a program what it does 
not know how to represent. It is not easy to see how a representation of the world 
as a collection of particles interacting by forces between each pair of particles, or as 
a giant quantum-mechanical wave function, can be used to implement common sense 
inside a machine (as stated in [ 31, both these representations are metaphysically but not 
epistemologically adequate). The second constraint is theoretical: the theories (axioms 
and inference rules) we develop must have a form which makes it possible to acquire 
the “necessary” (common sense) knowledge and to perform the “necessary” (common 
sense) reasoning (whatever we take “necessary” to mean, see Section 1.1). Thus for 
instance an epistemologically adequate representation must allow the computer to rep- 
resent “the information actually available to a subject under given circumstances” [7, 
p. 931, while an epistemologically inadequate formalism would not allow it to “achieve 
enough goals requiring general intelligence no matter how fast [it was] allowed to run” 
[ 6, p. 791. Not only must a representation schema be based on a correct ontology. It 
must also use theories of the world which actually represent the available knowledge 
and in a way to allow the advice taker to compute the facts needed to achieve a goal. 
In my opinion, epistemological adequacy is McCarthy’s most important defined notion, 
and also the most crucial to his research program. The requirement for epistemological 
‘In this paper we use the word “ontology” with a meaning different from that used by philosophers. 
According to philosophical usage, ontology is about what kinds of things there are [ 221. Here we use this 
word to refer to what kinds of things there are in the common sense world. This shift of meaning is consistent 
with our goals, and also justifiable, given that we are not interested in the philosophers’ question. 
4 The term “common sense informatic situation” is first introduced in 1231. 
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adequacy implicitly fixes the kind of formalisms and theories of common sense which 
must be developed and, at the same time, rules out a lot of possible options. For instance, 
it distinguishes AI from neurophysiology or other biology level approaches. (This view 
has been and is still very controversial, see for instance [24,25] .) In particular, in 
[4, p. 661 McCarthy points out that AI and neurophysiology will fruitfully interact 
(but not collapse!) once the neurophysiologists will be able to compare the AI epis- 
temological models with physiological data. The notion of epistemological adequacy is 
more compatible with psychology and in [4] McCarthy describes the many connections 
between the two disciplines. The distinction rises because of the need for generality 
implicit in the notion of epistemological adequacy. In [ 181 McCarthy points out that 
in psychology the subject of study is the realization of certain phenomena in humans, 
while AI is concerned with methods for achieving goals in general, independently of 
“whether the problem solver is a human, a Martian, or a computer program” [p. 2461. 
The requirement for epistemological adequacy yields (and, historically, has yielded) the 
development of an epistemic level theory of common sense (or using a similar notion 
introduced in [ 261, of a knowledge level theory of common sense). In my opinion, an 
appropriate name for such a theory of common sense is an epistemology of common 
sense. 
2. A science of common sense 
McCarthy’s interest is in a science of common sense, that is, in a systematic study of 
how common sense appears in nature, and on the formulation of laws which describe 
it in general terms. This emerges pretty clearly in many papers, e.g. in [5,7,14], and 
in particular in [4]. This last paper is a reaction to Sir James Lighthill’s report on AI, 
commissioned by the Science Research Council of Great Britain. As reported in [ 41, 
Lighthill classified the research in AI in three categories: category [A] was labeled 
as advanced automation or applications, category [C] comprised the studies of the 
central nervous system, while category [B] was defined as building robots and bridging 
between the other two categories. Lighthill’s classification implied that the research 
in category [B], where most of the research in AI was, was worthwhile only for its 
contribution to the other two categories. McCarthy strongly objects to Lighthill’s view 
of AI. As he writes, 
If we take this categorization seriously, then most AI researchers lose intellectual 
contact with Lighthill immediately, because his three categories have no place 
for what is or should be our main scientific activity-studying the structure 
of information and the structure of problem solving processes independently of 
applications and independently of their realization in animals or humans. [4, p. 
641 
McCarthy discusses in many papers the “kind of science” AI should develop into. 
We have discussed above the connections and differences between AI and psychology 
and neurophysiology. However, McCarthy mostly concentrates on the connections and 
differences with logic and philosophy, the two disciplines which, in his opinion, have 
most in common with AI. This will be the topic of the following two subsections. 
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2. I. The role oj’ philosoph) 
Philosophy and its connections with AI are discussed lengthily and technically in 
[ 3,6,7,18]. In [ 31, for instance, McCarthy describes some of the technical work devel- 
oped in the philosophical literature (e.g. modal logics) and points out its relevance to 
AI. McCarthy’s position can be synthetically described in three steps. 
First, there is a common interest in epistemology. Thus, for instance, in [ 71 McCarthy 
writes: 
Philosophy and artificial intelligence. These fields overlap in the following way: 
In order to make a computer program behave intelligently, its designer must 
build into it a view of the world in general, apart from what they include about 
particular sciences [p. I 141. 
Second, despite the common interest, there are many differences. Thus, for instance, in 
[ 61, McCarthy writes: 
The word epistemology is used in this paper substantially as many philosophers 
use it, but the problems considered here have a different emphasis. Philosophers 
emphasize what is potentially knowable with maxima1 opportunities to observe 
and compute, whereas AI must take into account what is knowable with available 
observational and computational facilities. Even so, many of the same formaliza- 
tions have both philosophical and AI interest. [p. 791 
(Notice how the word epistemology in the above quotation is given a meaning which 
is very reminiscent of the notion of epistemological adequacy.) 
Third, the many existing differences have more far reaching consequences than one 
might expect. In particular, antithetic philosophical systems are sometimes equivalent in 
their ability to explain how the world manifests itself in the common sense informatic 
situation. This makes many important philosophical debates and alternatives irrelevant 
for AI. For instance in [3] McCarthy writes: “Since the philosophers have not really 
come to an agreement in 2500 years, it might seem that artificial intelligence is in a rather 
hopeless state if it is to depend on getting concrete enough information out of philosophy 
to write computer programs. Fortunately, merely undertaking to embody the philosophy 
in a computer program involves making enough philosophical presuppositions to exclude 
most philosophy as irrelevant” [p. 241. In McCarthy’s view, a philosophical distinction 
becomes important only if and when it suggests alternative ways to proceed in the 
construction of the advice taker. Consider for instance McCarthy’s attitude towards the 
alternative between realism and empiricism, as discussed in [6,7]. In his view, it is 
better to build realist computer programs, rather than empiricist computer programs. 
A realist program would build theories of the world independently of its sense data, 
while the latter would build such theories only on the basis of an interpretation of such 
data. The latter program would have more partial theories of the world, only those 
emerging from its experience; and would not use a priori knowledge in the process of 
data interpretation. According to McCarthy, the second approach seems less likely to 
succeed than the first. As a second example, consider the motivations for studying the 
epistemological part of intelligence independently of the heuristic part (quotation from 
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p. 77). They all have a pragmatical, design oriented flavour. Essentially, the point is that 
making such a distinction is a good strategy for constructing the advice taker. 
2.2. The role of logic 
Properties 2 and 3 require that the advice taker be able to increment its knowledge 
meaningfully and independently of its current state. Property 2 requires that this be done 
by reasoning. Property 3 requires that this be done by interaction with the outside world. 
As described in [ 21, an advantageous way to achieve this is by using a declarative repre- 
sentation language (this paper also lists the advantages and disadvantages of declarative 
and imperative languages). Once the need for a declarative language has been accepted, 
logic becomes the obvious choice (see [2,3,5,18]). It provides a declarative language 
which can be used to represent knowledge, a formal notion of deduction which can be 
used to formalize and mechanize reasoning, and a set of formal tools which allow us 
to study the properties of the formalisms developed, e.g. their expressiveness and their 
consistency. 
In this perspective, logic is a tool, more than the object of interest; and, as such, it 
should be pursued to the extent needed for the development of the advice taker. This 
emerges very clearly from all the papers of the collection which use or talk about logic. 
In particular in [ 141 McCarthy writes: 
AI badly needs mathematical and logical theory, but the theory required involves 
conceptual innovations-not just mathematics. We won’t reach human level in- 
telligence by more algorithms reducing the complexity of a problem from n2 
to n log n, and still less by proofs that yet another problem is unsolvable or 
NP-complete. Of course, these results are often very significant as mathematics 
or computer science [pp. 187- 1881 
The choice of a logic-based approach to AI has been very controversial and discussed 
at length in the literature (see again [24,25] ). The main problem is that logic has 
been developed with goals quite different from AI, e.g. to prove the consistency of 
mathematical reasoning, or to provide semantics to (parts of) natural language (even if 
some parts of logic and the logic-based approach to AI share the goal of the formalization 
of reasoning). Though logic is a very good starting point which allows formalizing many 
forms of common sense, it is far from having the expressibility needed to represent 
common sense. As the collection makes clear, a lot of McCarthy’s technical work can 
be characterized as developing some of the extensions of logic needed in order to 
achieve epistemological adequacy. McCarthy argues at length in favour of his choice of 
a logic-based approach to AI in [ 14,181. However the following quotation articulates 
his position: 
There is an intuition that not all human reasoning can be translated into deduction 
in some formal system of mathematical logic, and therefore mathematical ogic 
should be rejected as a formalism for expressing what a robot should know 
about the world. The intuition in itself doesn’t carry a convincing idea of what 
is lacking and how it might be supplied. 
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We can confirm part of the intuition by describing a previously unformalized 
mode of reasoning called circumscription, which we can show does not cor- 
respond to deduction in a mathematical system. The conclusions it yields are 
just conjectures and sometimes even introduce inconsistency. We will argue that 
humans often use circumscription and robots must, too. The second part of the 
intuition-the rejection of mathematical ogic-is not confirmed, the new mode 
of reasoning is best understood and used within a mathematical ogical frame- 
work and coordinates well with mathematical logical deduction. We think that 
circumscription accounts for some of the successes and some of the errors of 
human reasoning. [6, p. 831 
2.3. A critique 
I am mostly in agreement with McCarthy’s perspective on logic. My view of logic, 
which, to some extent, can be seen as a summary of McCarthy’s position, is that logic 
(with respect to AI) should be seen as an applied science whose topic of study is 
common sense and its mechanization inside machines; and that logic should play for 
AI the same role that mathematics has played in the development of physics. The more 
common sense we formalize, the more we will need to develop logic . . . exactly as has 
happened for physics and mathematics. 
I am also mostly in agreement with McCarthy’s perspective on philosophy. However I 
believe that, pragmatically, McCarthy concentrates too much on the differences between 
AI and philosophy, and on what AI has to teach philosophy; and too little on what 
they have in common, and on what philosophy has to teach AI. The result is, in my 
opinion, that there has been little cross-fertilization between the two disciplines; and 
that this cross-fertilization has not gone to the core of problems. Thus, on one side, 
a lot of philosophical debates have been about the feasibility of the AI project in 
principle, essentially understood as the project of building an intelligent machine. Most 
of this work is, from my point of view, largely uninteresting and useless to the goal of 
building an advice taker. It misses many important aspects of the advice taker project, 
most noticeably, the crucial role of implementation and all the practical and theoretical 
issues it rises (for more about this point see Section 6.1). Vice versa, on the AI side, 
McCarthy has never tried to exploit the many results and ideas developed in “classical” 
philosophy, for instance in order to get a better understanding of the foundations and/ 
or implications of certain assumptions (e.g. the subjective view of common sense, the 
split of intelligence into a heuristic and an epistemological part, the requirement of 
epistemological adequacy, the rejection of modal logics). 5 
5 1 am aware that this last observation is of very high level and abstract. However an in depth discussion of 
this issue would require a lot of space and it would take us out of the main goals of this paper. An example 
of the kind of work I have in mind can be found in I27 1. This thesis shows that the use of contexts as 
described in [ 28 1 leads to a subjectivistic notion of meaning and makes a first attempt at a comparison with 
the context-based notion of meaning elaborated in 1291. Another thesis being currently developed tries to 
interpret the logic-based approach to Al in light of Husserl’s phenomenology. 
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3. Problems 
The work discussed in the previous sections sets the stage for the research which 
needs to be done. The next step, discussed by McCarthy in [6,15], is to isolate the set 
of problems which needs to be solved. Concerning common sense knowledge, we can 
distinguish the problems identified by McCarthy by their subject matter: 
( 1) Common sense knowledge about the world’s extension in time. McCarthy is 
mainly interested in formalizing and reasoning about the capability of our ac- 
tions (and other events) to influence the world’s temporal evolution, that is, in 
providing a theory of action (and events). Using a previously mentioned exam- 
ple from [ 151, a program which reasons about bacterial infections, like MYCIN, 
should be able to realize that if a patient has cholera, while the antibiotic is 
killing the cholera bacteria, the damage to his intestines is causing loss of fluids, 
which may cause death. 
(2) Common sense knowledge about the world’s extension in space. Objects are 
immersed in space; they often change their position and sometimes their shape. 
While this kind of knowledge is not needed for a program like MYCIN, it 
becomes relevant for a program which drives a navigating robot. 
(3) Common sense knowledge about internal states. The world is populated by ob- 
jects, e.g. people, programs and thermostats, which have an internal state which 
influences their behavior. In order to successfully interact (e.g. cooperate, com- 
pete) with such objects it seems quite useful to represent and reason about their 
state. Taking an example from [ 151, while reasoning about internal states is not 
necessary for a program like MYCIN, it may become necessary if we want to 
upgrade MYCIN to interact with users in a way which is dependent on their 
understanding of bacterial infections. 
McCarthy also discusses various problems in the formalization of common sense 
reasoning. Most of them can be characterized as being instances of: 
(4) People’s ability to jump to conclusions, 
(as also suggested by the title of Section 3 in [ 61). The most important instance is 
the “qualification problem”, discussed in [ 6,9], i.e. the problem of avoiding considering 
all the possible qualifications needed in order to make any sentence absolutely true. 
McCarthy discusses the qualification problem mainly in terms of reasoning about action. 
In this domain the qualification problem manifests itself in the practical (in my opinion, 
also in the theoretical) impossibility of reasoning about all the possible preconditions 
which must be true for an action to be applicable. Another instance, again in reasoning 
about action, is the “frame problem”, i.e. the probletn of expressing information and 
reasoning about what remains unchanged over time. Finally, ascribing mental qualities 
to a person or a machine, as in [ 7,131, really amounts to jumping to the conclusion that 
that person or machine has certain beliefs. 
Of course this is not to say that all of common sense reasoning amounts to jumping 
to conclusions. In other papers, e.g. [ 2,8,10], McCarthy describes and formalizes other 
forms of common sense reasoning. However all these formalizations are done in first 
order logic and are relatively unproblematic, once one has found the appropriate way 
to formalize the common sense knowledge involved. The point is that the notion of 
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deduction in logic provides us a formalization of the notion of reasoning. This cannot 
be done in the formalization of the reasoning involved in jumping to conclusions. In 
fact, one of the main properties of logic is monotonicity, i.e. if r t- A then T,B k A, 
where A, B are formulas and r is a set of formulas, and this is obviously not the case in 
the reasoning involved in jumping to conclusions, which is said to be “nonmonotonic”. 
For instance I may want to ascribe the belief Irishot to a thermostat until I realize that 
it has actually started the heating. This does not mean either that all common sense 
nonmonotonic reasoning amounts to jumping to conclusions. In [ 161, McCarthy lists 
some further uses of nonmonotonic reasoning, namely as a communication convention, 
as a database or information storage convention, as a representation of a policy, as a 
streamlined expression of probabilistic information, as a rule of auto-epistemic reasoning, 
as a rule of common sense physics and common sense psychology. 
4. Solutions 
McCarthy does not further elaborate on common sense spatial knowledge, nor does 
he propose any formalization of it (except the formalizations of “on” and “above” in 
[ 9,161) Most of his technical work is instead devoted to the formalization of the other 
three forms of common sense: the knowledge about time and action, the knowledge 
about internal states and people’s ability to jump to conclusions. The solutions proposed 
are briefly discussed below. 
4.1. Formalizing the “knowledge about time and action” 
McCarthy’s proposed formalism for reasoning about time and action is the situa- 
tion calculus, introduced in [ 31. Further discussions and examples can be found in 
[ 9,16,17,18]. The interested reader can also find many publications on the situation cal- 
culus by other authors in this journal. The name of this formalism derives from the fact 
that it includes, as part of its basic ontology, a new kind of object, called situation, where 
“A situation s is the complete state of the universe at an instant of time” [ 3, p. 351. 
Having situations as objects of the calculus allows us to use them as arguments 
to function and predicate symbols. McCarthy calls fiuents those applicational symbols 
whose domain is the space Sit of situations. A propositional fluent returns a truth value, 
a situational fluent returns a situation. In [3] McCarthy introduces some of the fluents 
necessary for the formalization of the common sense informatic situation: 
l at(p, x, s) (which intuitively means that a person p is in the place x in the situation 
S) and in( x, y, s) (which intuitively means that x is in the location y in the situation 
s). These two fluents allow us to express propositions about the world embedding 
in space. 
l time(s) (which intuitively is the time of the situation s). This fluent allows us to 
express propositions about the world embedding in time. 
l result(p, IT, s) (which intuitively means the situation resulting from the person p 
performing action (T in situation s). This fluent allows us to express propositions 
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about the world’s evolution through situations as a consequence of some action 
being performed. 
McCarthy introduces the situation calculus without much motivation. Most notice- 
ably, he does not motivate the decision for a calculus of situations, as opposed to a 
calculus of time. Notice that he explicitly acknowledges in [ 31 that the calculi defined 
prior to [ 31 are temporal calculi. In [ 31 he also points out that, technically, for any 
temporal calculus a situation calculus can be constructed with the same expressibility 
and proof-theoretic strength (citing Prior’s work described in [ 301). At a first sight, 
time might seem, and seemed to me, the right horizon over which to project the world 
evolution. This is because, contrary to what is (partially) the case with the world 
state and spatial coordinates, time is the coordinate over which we do not have any 
control. In this view, time objects (e.g. instants, intervals) are to be taken as ontologi- 
cal primitives while situations can be constructed, e.g., by applying a function symbol 
situation to time instants. However, after a closer look, a calculus of situations eems 
epistemologically more adequate, at least in some applications. For instance in the case 
of temporal projection, it is possible to consider alternative developments of events, 
not only of the actual course of history, and impose with a very simple axiom like 
time( resuft( p, ~1, s) ) = time( result( p, ~2, s) ) that two actions have the same duration. 
The general argument is that a lot of the common sense reasoning about the world is 
about the effects of actions on its state. Time is considered only when needed, e.g. when 
it is a necessary precondition for some action to be performed, like catching a train. 
4.2. Formalizing the “knowledge about internal states” 
In [ 7,131 McCarthy proposes that we reason about internal states in terms of a 
certain set of high level abstract primitives, called mental qualities, such as belief and 
self-belief, knowledge and self-knowledge, consciousness and self-consciousness, free 
will, intention and so on. The argument is that mental qualities are needed in order to 
have epistemologically adequate theories of machines, especially when such machines 
are complex and not completely understood. In particular in [ 131 McCarthy writes that 
“the language [used to describe internal states] must be able to express the information 
our program can actually get about a person’s or machine’s ‘state of mind’-not just 
what might be obtainable if the neurophysiology of the human or the design of the 
machine were more accessible” [p. 1811. 
Roughly speaking, McCarthy’s mental qualities are a superset of what is usually called 
propositional attitudes. Historically, the most common approach to the formalization of 
propositional attitudes is based on modal logics [ 3 1 I. McCarthy does not believe that 
modal logics are an appropriate tool for the formalization of mental qualities. In [ 8, p. 
1381 he argues that many problems can be solved in first order logics; that many of 
the existing problem solvers are based on first order logics; that some of the existing 
work in modal theorem proving, i.e. that described in [32], is based on a translation 
of modal logics into first order logics; and that modal logics change both the syntax 
and the semantics of first order logics. This last consideration is quite convincing as it 
points out that, using modal logics, the treatment of mental qualities, which might be a 
small part of a problem, affects the formalization of the other parts. 
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McCarthy introduces and develops the formalism for reasoning about mental qualities 
in [ 6,8]. His solution is based on two main recipes. The first is the reification of con- 
cepts and propositions as objects of the language. This allows him to obtain the same 
expressiveness as propositional modal logics. The reason for this choice is that “Admit- 
ting individual concepts as objects-with concept-valued constants, variables, functions, 
and expressions-allows ordinary first order theories of necessity, knowledge, belief, 
and wanting without modal operators or quotation marks and without the restrictions on 
substituting equals for equals that either device makes necessary. . [This formaliza- 
tion] doesn’t modify the logic and is more powerful, because it includes mappings from 
objects to concepts” [ 8, pp. 119- 1201. The second recipe is the reification of possible 
worlds as objects of the language. This allows him to obtain the same expressiveness as 
quantified modal logics. McCarthy seems much less convinced of this second choice. In 
[ 8, p. 1351 he explicitly admits that he uses possible worlds reluctantly. 
McCarthy does not provide a comprehensive technical analysis, with, for instance, 
equivalence results with modal logics. However, he provides formalizations of many in- 
teresting examples. In particular in [ lo] he describes the formalization and mechaniza- 
tion inside the interactive theorem prover FOL [ 331 of two puzzles involving knowledge. 
These formalizations are quite interesting as they show how it is possible to exploit the 
reification of worlds in a syntax which expresses both knowing what and knowing that 
[ 81, joint knowledge, nonknowledge, and the evolution over time of knowledge. Most 
interesting, this last feature is obtained simply by making the predicate formalizing the 
accessibility relation between worlds take an extra time/situation argument (the idea 
being that what is known is a function of what holds in all the accessible worlds, and 
that the accessible worlds change in dependence with the new facts which are acquired 
over time). 
4.3. Formalizing “Jumping to conclusions” 
McCarthy’s proposed formalism for nonmonotonic reasoning is “circumscription”, i.e. 
a rule of conjecture which allows a person or program to jump to the conclusion that the 
objects which can be shown to have a certain property P by reasoning on a given set of 
facts are all the objects that satisfy P. Various axiomatic forms of circumscription, all 
variations of this basic idea, and many examples of use are given in [6,9,16]. Let us 
consider for instance the form of circumscription defined in [9]. Let P be a predicate 
symbol and A a first order sentence. Let A (@) be the result of replacing all occurrences 
of P in A with @. Then the circumscription of P in A is the sentence schema 
A(@) AVX.(@(Z) ---t P(X)) -+ E?.(P(X) ---) Q(E)) 
where X stands for the tuple XI, . , x,. Intuitively, this formula says that if A(@) holds, 
and if @ has a smaller extension of P, then P and @ have the same extension. In other 
words, the set of objects which satisfy P is made as small as that satisfying @. Thus 
for instance, taking an example from [ 91, let P be the predicate isblock (stating of its 
argument that it is a block), and A the following formula 
isblock B A isblock C A isblock D. (1) 
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Then, computing the circumscription of isblock in ( 1) and performing some small 
amount of first order reasoning leads to the formula 
‘dx.(isbZockx--+(x=BVx=CVx=D)), 
which states that B ,C, D are the only objects which are blocks. Circumscription, like 
the situation calculus is one of the most studied and well-known formalisms in AI. The 
interested reader can find a lot of material about circumscription in [ 34,351. 
4.4. A critique 
McCarthy’s proposed formalisms are a step towards the solution of some of the 
problems described in Section 3. However, it is often not obvious to see how these 
formalisms can be effectively used in the implementation of the advice taker, or, more 
simply, in practical applications. 
A first difficulty comes from the way solutions are discussed and proposed. Mc- 
Carthy’s approach is articulated in three steps. In the first he identifies a problem, in 
the second he constructs an example which isolates the problem in a simple and crisp 
way and, finally, in the third, he provides a solution to the example. (In [ 111 all three 
steps are performed within a single paper.) This approach allows for theoretically clean 
solutions. McCarthy’s solutions are general, that is not example specific, and provide 
insights about how to solve the problem identified. Furthermore, he is always careful 
in pointing out the extent to which his proposals solve or do not solve the problem 
(see for instance the examples in [ 11,12,16], but also the discussion at the end of 
[ 41) . However, the examples considered are very idealized and detached from how 
the problem manifests itself in practice. As a consequence, it is often not obvious to 
see how the proposed solutions can be scaled up to more concrete applications. This 
is the case for instance for nonmonotonic reasoning. Here, many different forms of 
circumscription have been defined (e.g. domain circumscription, predicate circumscrip- 
tion, formula circumscription, prioritized circumscription, pointwise circumscription). 
The nonexpert is faced with a set of techniques which look like ad hoc solutions in- 
vented to solve specific examples, rather than facilities of general utility. He is left 
with many choices whose applicability is not clear, and with very little help. It is hard 
to see how to map the problems arising in practical applications into the idealized, 
simple problems used to introduce and motivate the various forms of circumscrip- 
tion. 
A second difficulty arises because the solutions proposed introduce a certain level of 
complexity, which seems sometimes due to the formalism, more than to the intrinsic 
complexity of the phenomenon to be modeled. This is the case for instance for Mc- 
Carthy’s formalism for representing mental qualities. Here the reification of individual 
concepts, together with all the related machinery for handling them, allows us to reach 
the necessary expressibility. However this richer ontology and machinery introduces ex- 
tra complexity which must always be dealt with, even when not necessary. This becomes 
cumbersome when dealing with “simple” situations where, at least in his mind, one is 
forced to make distinctions which would not naturally arise. 
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5. Difficulties 
McCarthy’s research program and the proposed solutions present many difficulties. 
McCarthy is aware of this and writes about it in various papers of the collection. In 
particular he identifies three major difficulties. As discussed in [ 111, a first difficulty 
comes from splitting the heuristic and the epistemological part of intelligence. The 
starting point of the discussion is Kowalski’s equation ALGORITHM = LOGIC + CONTROL 
[ 361, an equation which resembles the distinction between the epistemological part and 
the heuristic part of intelligence. As stated at the very beginning of [ 1 I 1, 
The formula isn’t precise, and it won’t be until someone proposes a precise and 
generally accepted notion of how control is to be added to an expression of the 
logic of a program. [p. 1671 
This paper discusses this problem through the study of various algorithms for coloring 
planar maps. It starts by discussing an algorithm written in Prolog by Pereira and 
Porto and proceeds by describing a new solution which implements two ideas adapted 
from Kempe’s 1879 incorrect proof of the four color theorem. It poses the question of 
whether an algorithm using these ideas can be regarded as a form of control added to 
the logic program, or whether these ideas must necessarily be implemented as a new 
program. 
A second difficulty is in the use of logic and in the declarative representation of 
knowledge. Progress in this direction is slower than one might have expected. In [ 181 
McCarthy writes: 
Existing computer programs come more or less close to this goal [of expressing 
information in logical sentences], depending on the extent to which they use the 
formalisms of logic. I shall begin by describing four levels of their use. 
( I ) A machine on the lowest level uses no logical sentences. All its “beliefs” 
are implicit in its state. 
(2) The next level of use of logic involves computer programs that use sen- 
tences in machine memory to represent their beliefs but use other rules than 
ordinary logical inference to reach conclusions. . . Moreover, the sentences 
that appear in memory are from a program-dependent subset of the logical 
language being used. Adding certain true sentences in the language may 
even spoil the functioning of the program. Logic is used at this second level 
in “expert systems”. 
(3) The third level uses first order logic as well as logical deduction. Usually the 
sentences are represented as clauses, and the deduction methods are based 
on J. Alan Robinson’s ( 1965) [ 371 method of resolution. . . . 
Examples of such programs used commercially are “expert system shells” 
(ART, KEE, OPS-5) -computer programs that create generic expert sys- 
tems. . . . 
Although they express both facts and rules as logical sentences, third 
level systems are still rather specialized, . . . For this reason, the facts of one 
program usually cannot be used in a database for other programs. 
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(4) The fourth level is still a goal. It involves representing general facts about the 
world as logical sentences. Once put in a database, the facts can be used by 
any program. The facts would have the neutrality of purpose characteristic 
of much human reasoning. The supplier of information would not have 
to understand the goals of the potential user or how his mind works. The 
present ways of “teaching” computer programs amount to education by brain 
surgery. [pp. 238-2411 
(Notice how the properties requested at the fourth level are again the three basic 
properties of common sense described in Section 1.1.) 
Finally, a third major problem is articulated in [ 171 where McCarthy writes: 
It was obvious in 1971 and even in 1958 that AI programs suffered from a lack 
of generality. It is still obvious and now there are many more details. The first 
gross symptom is that a small addition to the idea of a program often involves a 
complete rewrite beginning with the data structures . . . 
Another symptom is that no one knows how to make a general database of 
common sense knowledge that could be used by any program that needed the 
knowledge. [p. 2261 
5.1. A critique 
The lack of generality is, in my opinion, a consequence of the fact that aZE our 
theories of the world are necessarily approximate, i.e. they do not (and cannot, not even 
in principle) describe the world completely. The point is that the approximations we 
perform in the formalization of a problem are dependent on the problem being solved. 
Any new problem will impose a new view of the world which in turn may hide some 
details and highlight others previously not considered. 
McCarthy realizes that many theories of the world are approximate (even if I have 
not found in any of the papers of the collection a sentence stating that this is always the 
case). In [ 31 he points out that any formalization of common sense temporal knowledge 
is necessarily approximate, in that it will fail to capture all that is true in the world. 
Thus, for instance, resuZt(p,u, s) should be regarded as being defined in a certain 
representation of the world, as opposed to the world itself; and such representation 
will be necessarily approximate. In [6] he makes clear that the frame problem and the 
qualification problems are specific instances of reasoning within approximate theories. 
In [7] he points out that the ascription of mental qualities, though very useful when 
reasoning about machines whose structure is not completely known, will lead to the 
development of theories which are necessarily approximate. This leads him in [7] 
to stating the need for definitions with respect to an approximate theory (where the 
constraint is that a definition cannot be more precise than the theory permits), and 
of second order structural definitions (as opposed to external “behavioral” definitions, 
where second orderness is used to assert that certain beliefs are “good” for a machine 
A4 living in a world W). 
However, I have found nowhere in McCarthy’s papers a statement which links the 
problem of generality and the problem of having approximate theories. In my opinion, 
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the identification of this connection allows us to understand and approach both problems 
in a unified and more general perspective. First of all, the qualification problem and the 
frame problem become instances of the problem of generality (this is discussed in 
[ 381). Second, as we know a priori that our theories of the world are necessarily 
approximate, we can exploit this to achieve locality, i.e. to reason with the least possible 
amount of information. The idea is to throw away as much information as possible 
and reason in a theory which is very approximate but still general enough to allow 
for a meaningful solution to the problem to be solved. (The advantages of achieving 
locality, its relevance to common sense reasoning, and a formalization using contexts, 
are discussed in [ 281.) Third, this perspective highlights the fact that the problem of 
generality cannot be solved a priori, e.g. by having a completely general theory of the 
world. This suggests a solution where the (approximate) theories we use are formulated 
and reformulated depending on the problem to be solved (see [ 381 for a more detailed 
discussion). 
6. Achievements 
Starting from the 1959 formulation of the advice taker project, McCarthy’s research 
in AI has undergone three major conceptual steps: 
( 1) Identification of the need for common sense and of an epistemology of common 
sense. The main contributions in this phase are the identification of common 
sense as the key aspect of the advice taker, and of the need for epistemological 
adequacy (this has been discussed in Section 1) . 
(2) Identification of the need for a science of common sense. The main contribution 
here is the proposal of a logic-based approach to AI (this has been discussed in 
Section 2). 
(3) Development of some major contributions. These consist of the identification of 
some epistemological problems to be solved, the development of some technical 
solutions, and the recognition of some outstanding difficulties (this has been 
discussed in Sections 3, 4, 5). 
As discussed in various papers e.g. [ I 1,14,17,18] and also in Section 5 of this 
review, the advice taker project is still very far from accomplishment. However since 
1959, major progress has been made and the stage for further research has been set. We 
have identified the target of our research, i.e. common sense, we have identified how to 
study it, i.e. by developing an epistemology of common sense, we have identified the 
formal tool for formalizing it, i.e. logic, and we have identified problems and proposed 
(partial) solutions which we have tested against case studies. I think that all of this can 
be summarized by saying that McCarthy has been successful in identifying, proposing 
and pushing the development of a new science, which can be called an epistemological 
science of common sense. It is a science because of what we discussed in Section 2; it 
is an epistemological science because, following what we discussed in Section 1, it aims 
at developing epistemic level theories of common sense. This is by far McCarthy’s main 
achievement, the one which has had and will have lasting influence in the scientific and 
technological development of AI and computer science. 
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6.1. A critique 
The papers in the collection suggest that McCarthy has not paid much attention 
to some important problems which arise in the process of mechanizing the theories 
developed on paper. The development on paper of a theory is only the first step. A 
straightforward mechanization very rarely works. This is because the ideas and formal- 
izations developed on paper are implicitly based on assumptions which often make their 
implementation infeasible in practice. The problems which usually arise are that the 
resulting programs are too big, or hard to write or to maintain, or simply too slow-all 
problems which make theories fail the requirement of “practicality” necessary in order 
to achieve epistemological adequacy. 
Of course, this is not to say that McCarthy has not worried about mechanization. His 
contributions in the development of programming languages (and theory of computation) 
suitable for writing programs with common sense are (again) impressive. It is sufficient 
to recall his work on LISP [ 39,401 and the (still unpublished) work on Elephant 
2000 [ 411. LISP’s sophisticated symbol manipulation facilities are a first important 
step towards building a program which solves problems by manipulating sentences in a 
formal language. Elephant’s high level interaction facilities are very useful in order to 
build programs which can increment what they know by being told. (Along the same 
lines as Elephant but perhaps less ambitious, is the work on CBCL described in [ 121.) 
It does not mean either that he has not worried about the implementation of the theories 
he has proposed. For instance, the examples in [lo] and some of those in [ 161 have 
been mechanized. Moreover, as discussed in Section 4.2, some of the motivations for 
rejecting modal logics are implementational. 
These are all important contributions towards the mechanization of common sense, 
but not all the story. Consider for instance the implementation of propositional attitudes 
inside complex reasoning programs, e.g. natural language understanding systems or 
multiagent systems. Here, the most efficient problem solvers are first order theorem 
provers based on the reification of possible worlds in the syntax (see for instance [ 421) . 
This shows that some of the intuitions and motivations given by McCarthy in favour 
of a first order treatment of mental qualities are correct (see Section 4.2). ’ However 
these results have not had the impact that one might have expected. Most existing 
applications do not use any of the proposed formalisms, nor the associated theorem 
provers. A major problem is that it is not clear how to codify into these formalisms 
all the necessary information (e.g. the agents’ knowledge; their reasoning capabilities, 
which are usually different for each agent; the usually very complex interactions among 
them) in a way to have efficient, easy to develop and to maintain, implementations. 
There is a practical impossibility to use these formalisms, which makes them fail the 
requirement of epistemological adequacy, once the task boils down to developing a 
concrete application. 
As far I can judge, nowhere in the papers of this collection, does McCarthy discuss 
these issues. Indeed, there is a sense in which some of his work worsens this problem; 
6 For the sake of completeness, it must be said that these formalisms are quite different from McCarthy’s 
However they are arguably simpler to handle. This strengthens the argument given below. 
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see, for instance, Section 4.4. However, in my opinion these issues are crucial for the 
future development of AI. Failing to consider them may result in a situation where the- 
ory and applications proceed in parallel with very little cross-fertilization. Let us further 
consider the mechanization of propositional attitudes. In practical applications, the most 
common approach is to represent the beliefs of an agent as a set of facts plus some 
way to deduce consequences from them (see for instance [ 43-451) . Until recently, this 
and the logic-based work (e.g. modal logics or McCarthy’s formalism) were developed 
independently, the first lacking theoretical foundations, the second being hardly appli- 
cable in real systems. This problem is fixed in [46], which, via an equivalence result, 
shows that the latter representation schema, under certain conditions, has the same or 
more expressibility than modal logics. This result sets the stage for further substantial 
development in the mechanization of propositional attitudes inside complex programs 
(and, ultimately, inside the advice taker). It provides in fact a foundation to the applied 
work; and a clear methodology for replicating and extending it in new implementations. 
It also provides motivation for further theoretical work aiming at incorporating into the 
existing formalisms some of the features needed in actual implementations. 
7. Should we read the collection? 
There are various books about common sense and the logic-based approach to AI, see 
for instance [ 47,481. These books are more exhaustive, contain a lot of background ma- 
terial and also more recent developments. However, this collection provides a different 
(and maybe unique) perspective on AI, a perspective which comes after reading, think- 
ing about, and comparing the ideas expressed in papers written by one of the founders 
of the field over a period of more than thirty years. Reading the collection has made me 
acquire a clearer and more general perspective of what I am doing, and of why I am 
doing it. Moreover many papers, even the earlier ones, have been a very good source 
of inspiration and have suggested, or in other cases reinforced, some ideas of possible 
lines of future research. For this reason I believe that any researcher in AI, even those 
not interested in a logic-based approach, should spend some time reading, or rereading, 
the papers of the collection. 
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